The High Court has held that legal advice privilege cannot be claimed in respect of tax advice received by a client from a tax accountant: R (on the application of Prudential PLC) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax (High Court, 14 October 2009). The court held that it was bound by the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Wilden Pump to reject Prudential’s contention that LPP should be construed as encompassing the advice of professionals other than lawyers on legal matters.
The case confirms, therefore, that, at common law, legal advice privilege will not be available for other professionals who advise on the law: whether accountants, insolvency practitioners, patent and trade mark attorneys, loss adjusters etc. Accordingly, it remains the case that it is only the clients of lawyers who are protected from disclosure of legal advice under legal advice privilege.
Background
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) served Prudential with notices under the Taxes Management Act 1970 (TMA 1970) seeking disclosure of documents relating to a commercially marketed tax avoidance scheme. Prudential sought judicial review of the decision to serve these notices and, in particular, argued that (1) the notices sought material subject to legal professional privilege (LPP) in the form of tax advice on the scheme received from PwC and (2) the notices sought material that was not relevant to the determination of any tax liability.
LPP defence
The House of Lords held in Morgan Grenfell that the TMA 1970 provisions authorising HMRC to require disclosure of material did not override LPP. Prudential sought to argue that LPP applies whenever “a person obtains skilled legal advice about tax law from an accountant, as opposed to a lawyer”, such that the legal advice on the tax avoidance scheme received from PwC was protected from disclosure.
It was common ground that there was no decided case in which the precise issue put forward by Prudential had been addressed and answered after a detailed examination of matter. Accordingly, the court went back to first principles and considered the intrinsic nature of LPP and its public policy justification. It was important to recognise the distinction between two aspects of LPP, legal advice privilege and litigation privilege. Importantly, the court was only concerned with legal advice privilege in this case. (Although Prudential argued that legal advice privilege and litigation privilege are integral parts of a single privilege right, and that, since litigation privilege can extend beyond lawyers in some circumstances so could legal advice privilege, the judge rejected the contention that the two aspects of LPP could not have separate requirements.)
The judge, Charles J, recognised that LPP is a common law principle and therefore can be developed by the courts to have regard to changing circumstances. Nevertheless, his review of legal advice privilege case law indicated that LPP is clearly linked to the legal profession and not just to the purpose and nature of the advice and assistance given. Indeed, the judge noted that all relevant textbooks (including Passmore: Privilege) “speak with a common voice that LPP applies to communications with lawyers and not other professionals” and that Parliament has proceeded on the basis that special provision needs to be made if an equivalent right is to be conferred clients of persons who are not members of the legal profession.
Ultimately, however, the judge held that he was bound by the earlier Court of Appeal decision inWilden Pump (curiously not referred to by either side in argument) to decide that legal advice privilege is, as currently determined, limited to legal advice from lawyers. Wilden Pump involved a claim that privilege applied to legal advice provided by patent agents. The Court of Appeal rejected that contention and the invitation to extend the common law privilege to other professionals with an important specialist knowledge of the law.
Relevance defence
Prudential pointed out that earlier guidance from HMRC (since withdrawn) had accepted that “pure legal advice”, that is advice concerned with whether specific pieces of legislation apply to a given transaction, is simply opinion on the law and would be exempt from disclosure except in exceptional circumstances. Prudential argued that departure from this practice was unlawful. The judge rejected this.
Firstly, there was no practice or policy to be departed from (it had been withdrawn, albeit without any fanfare).
Secondly, HMRC did accept that in many cases pure legal advice would not be disclosable as it would be irrelevant. However, the test for Prudential to overcome was whether HMRC had reasonable opinion that the documents contained or could contain information relevant to the tax liability in question. Information which may be relevant is not limited to factual material and it does not need to be necessary for the determination. To show that there was no possibility that the documents could contain relevant information is clearly a difficult burden.
In any event, based on documents already disclosed by Prudential, HMRC had formed the view that not all relevant documents had been disclosed. In particular, disclosed documents pointed to the existence of earlier drafts and proposals which would have relevance to how the scheme developed and correspondence with accountants dealing with implementation of the arrangements. These earlier documents suggested the careful omission of references to certain dividend payments, for example, to bolster arguments they were not an inevitability. The Special Commissioners had concluded that the officer was entirely reasonable to consider that the true purpose of the transactions had been glossed over in documents provided and that a decision to declare the dividend had already been made. That conclusion could not be impeached and, indeed, the court considered that what was being requested was not pure legal advice but information concerning the nature of the transactions and in particular what was or was not preordained.
Comment
Although the judge held himself bound by the decision in Wilden Pump, he did also accept that Prudential had put forward a “compelling, and indeed unanswerable, case” that in modern conditions accountants do what lawyers do in cases that establish LPP. He also expressed the view that “there is real strength in the argument that the extent of the right to refuse disclosure should not relate to the nature of the legal qualification of the person giving the advice”. The implication appears to be that, whilst the High Court could not amend the ambit of LPP, perhaps the Supreme Court might.
However, interestingly, the judge also suggested that rather than giving clients of accountants the same rights as clients of lawyers, a level playing field might also be achieved by reducing the rights of clients of lawyers to those of other professionals providing legal advice. Indeed, this appears to be the judge’s preference and he explicitly suggested that “the conclusion underlying LPP that there is a need for absolute confidentiality in respect of legal advice may need revisiting”. How this fits with Lord Hoffmann’s description of LPP is a “fundamental human right” is unclear.
As regards relevance, the decision supports HMRC’s current approach that, whilst pure legal advice is not normally relevant, in tax avoidance cases where the purpose of the parties is important, communications between adviser and client that go to the structuring of the scheme, the purpose of the scheme and whether certain elements are preordained are in a different category.
Ultimately, the decision means that clients of tax accountants, or indeed any other non lawyers that advise on legal issues, cannot claim legal advice privilege. As such, they will receive less protection from disclosure of legal advice than the clients of lawyers.

Jeyapalan Kasipillai … “GST can be a progressive tax.’